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Coordinating the operation of combined heat and power plants (CHPs) and heat pumps (HPs) at the
interface between heat and power systems is essential to achieve a cost-effective and efficient operation of
the overall energy system. Indeed, in the current sequential market practice, the heat market has no insight
into the impacts of heat dispatch on the electricity market. While preserving this sequential practice, this
paper introduces an “electricity-aware” heat unit commitment model. Coordination is achieved through “bid-
validity” constraints, which embed the techno-economic linkage between heat and electricity outputs and
costs of CHPs and HPs. This approach constitutes a novel market mechanism for the coordination of heat
and power systems, defining heat bids conditionally on electricity market prices. The resulting model is
a trilevel optimization problem, which we recast as a mixed-integer linear program using a lexicographic
function. We use a realistic case study based on the Danish power and heat system, and show that the
proposed model yields a 4.5% reduction in total operating cost of heat and power systems compared to a
traditional decoupled unit commitment model, while reducing the financial losses of each CHP and HP due
to invalid bids by up-to 20.3 million euros.
Key words : Bid validity, Unit commitment, Multi-carrier energy systems, trilevel optimization.
1. Introduction
Exploiting potential synergies between power and other energy systems has been identified as a
key solution to achieve a flexible and sustainable energy future (Lund 2007, Meibom et al. 2013,
Pinson et al. 2017). In particular, an integrated power and heat system is central in a sustainable
energy system due to strong technical and economic interdependencies between these two systems
(Heat Road Map Europe 2018, Lund et al. 2010, 2014). In several countries, energy markets operate
heat and power systems in the day-ahead stage sequentially and independently. For instance, in
Denmark, the day-ahead heat market is cleared before the electricity market (Pinson et al. 2017).
The main shortcoming of such a sequential framework is that the heat-driven dispatch of assets at
the interface of power and heat systems, including Combined Heat and Power (CHP) units and Heat
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Pumps (HPs), may limit their operational flexibility1 in the electricity market (Chen et al. 2015).
Importantly, the potential lack of flexibility may hinder the increasing penetration of renewable
energy sources. This challenge raises an important research question: How to improve the dispatch
of CHPs and HPs in the heat market in order to achieve a cost-effective and efficient operation of the
overall energy system while preserving the current sequential energy market-clearing framework?
This question has been extensively addressed in the literature by proposing a drastic change in
the current market design, i.e., moving towards fully integrated approaches based on power and
heat co-optimization. Chen et al. (2015) propose a combined economic dispatch for heat and power
systems, which increases the flexibility of CHPs at the interface between both systems. In addition,
Li et al. (2016), Zheng et al. (2018), Mitridati and Taylor (2018) and Dai et al. (2018) develop
optimization models accounting for the dynamics of heat transfer in the district heating network,
making it possible to utilize the capability of storing energy in heat pipelines. All these studies
illustrate the benefits of power and heat co-optimization, as well as the accurate representation of
techno-economic characteristics of the district heating system. However, all these co-optimization
models can be considered as ideal benchmarks only, since they require disruptive regulatory changes
in the way the current energy markets operate.
By opposition with these fully integrated operational approaches, Mitridati et al. (2020a) in-
troduces a novel formulation of the heat market-clearing problem. This approach provides a soft
coordination between heat and power systems while respecting the sequential clearing of their re-
spective markets. This coordination is achieved by modeling the heat market clearing as a bilevel
optimization problem, which seeks to minimize the heat dispatch cost in the upper level, while antic-
ipating the impact of heat dispatch of CHPs and HPs on the electricity market clearing in the lower
level. Although the heat market-clearing model proposed in Mitridati et al. (2020a) respects the
sequential heat and electricity market-clearing framework, it does not account for the non-convex
temperature dynamics in district heating networks and the complex techno-economic characteristics
of CHPs and HPs, such as their start-up and no-load costs as well as minimum on/off times. Adding
these complexities requires solving a heat unit commitment model, but brings pricing challenges due
to introducing 0/1 binary variables (Ruiz et al. 2012, O’Neill et al. 2005). Furthermore, the market-
clearing procedure proposed in Mitridati et al. (2020a) results increased computational complexity
for the heat market operator, and pricing issues arising from non-convexities. To tackle the above
challenge, we draw inspiration from the notion of bid-validity constraints introduced in Byeon and
Van Hentenryck (2020), that addresses the coordination problem of power and natural gas (but not
heat) systems.
1Operational flexibility refers to the capability of an energy system to adjust its schedule in response to a change in
renewable energy generation (Zhao et al. 2016).
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This paper makes two contributions to the heat market design. The first contribution introduces
an electricity-aware bid format based on the concept of bid-validity constraints. This format en-
ables CHPs and HPs to submit their bids in the heat market that are conditioned on electricity
market prices. This novel bid format implicitly takes into account the complex techno-economic
characteristics of CHPs and HPs at the interface between heat and electricity markets, while the
traditional bid formats, e.g., price-quantity bids, do not. We show that, under mild assumptions on
the marginal heat production costs of heat market participants, these bids can be modelled using
a set of linear constraints. The second contribution is an electricity-aware heat unit commitment
model which anticipates the interdependencies between the heat and electricity market clearings
through the proposed electricity-aware heat bid format. Furthermore, the proposed heat unit com-
mitment accounts for the flexibility of the district heating network by optimizing time delays in
heat transfer. The resulting trilevel optimization problem considers the heat unit commitment in
the upper level, the heat market clearing in the middle level, and the electricity market clearing in
the lower level.
The main methodological contribution of the paper concerns computational scalability: It shows
that the proposed trilevel optimization problem can be reformulated as a tractable single-level
mixed-integer linear program (MILP) using a lexicographic function and the strong duality of the
middle- and lower-level problems.
Finally, the last contribution of the paper concerns the evaluation of the new market on a sub-
stantial case study. The evaluation compares the proposed electricity-aware unit commitment model
to a traditional decoupled model using a realistic case study representing the Danish power and
heat systems over one year of operation. This analysis provides the basis for quantifying the value of
the proposed bid-validity mechanism in terms of decreased system cost of the overall energy system
and reduced wind power curtailment. It yields a 4.5% reduction in total operating cost of heat and
power systems compared to a traditional decoupled unit commitment model, while reducing the
financial losses of each CHP and HP due to invalid bids by up-to 20.3 million euros.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the required preliminaries
and describes the techno-economic interdependencies between heat and power systems. Section
3 introduces the proposed bid-validity approach and the electricity-aware heat unit commitment
model. Section 4 details the mathematical formulation of the proposed electricity-aware heat unit
commitment model. Section 5 presents numerical results, and Section 6 concludes and discusses
potential extensions of this work. The extended formulations are provided in the online appendix,
available at Mitridati et al. (2020b).
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2. Preliminaries
2.1. Existing day-ahead heat and electricity markets
In Nordic countries, such as Denmark, heat and power systems are operated by competitive auction-
based markets which interface the physical and economic aspects of each system. Energy markets,
such as day-ahead heat and electricity markets, operate on the principles of energy exchanges, in
which market participants submit bids which implicitly embed their techno-economic characteristics.
Additionally, day-ahead heat and electricity markets are cleared sequentially and independently,
with the heat market being cleared before the electricity market. In the day-ahead heat market,
each market participant j ∈ IH submits bids b ∈ BH = {b1, .., bBH} for each hour of the following
day t ∈ T , in the form of independent price-quantity pairs (cHjbt, sHjbt). These bids are dispatched
by the heat market operator based on a merit-order and least-cost principle. Once the heat market
has been cleared, each electricity market participant j ∈ IE submits bids b˜∈BE{b1, .., bBE} for each
hour of the following day, in the form of independent price-quantity pairs
(
cE
jb˜t
, sE
jb˜t
)
. Furthermore,
market participants may choose to self-commit a certain minimum electricity production sEjt, which
will be dispatched regardless of the equilibrium price in the market. These bids are dispatched by
the electricity market operator based on a merit-order and least-cost principle. Note that heat and
electricity market operators are not necessarily the same entities.
Contrary to energy markets operating on the principles of energy pools, such as the North Amer-
ican markets, physical flows and congestion in each market zone are managed a posteriori by the
transmission systems operators (Meeus et al. 2005). Therefore, uniform prices are obtained as
the marginal prices in each market zone. In European countries, interconnected electricity market
zones are coupled based on Available Transfer Capacities (ATC) (ETSO 2000, Tosatto and Chatzi-
vasileiadis 2020), which represent inter-zonal power transfer bounds. Similarly, heat transfer bounds
between nodes of the transmission network are enforced in the day-ahead heat market clearing.
2.2. Physical and economic interfaces between heat and power systems
CHPs and HPs participate in both heat and electricity markets. The techno-economic characteristics
of these units, linking their heat and electricity outputs, create implicit interdependencies in the
operations of both systems. The heat and electricity production of CHPs are constrained by their
joint Feasible Operating Region (FOR) (Lahdelma and Hakonen 2003). The majority of CHPs are
extraction units that can produce heat and electricity at different ratios. Their FOR can be modeled
by a set of linear equations, which represents their minimum heat to power ratio, and the upper and
lower bounds on their fuel consumption, expressed as a linear function of their heat and electricity
production. Similarly, the heat production of HPs is proportional to their electricity consumption,
with a fixed heat-to-power ratio, called the Coefficient of Performance (COP).
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In addition to the aforementioned physical interdependencies, the production costs of CHPs and
HPs are intrinsically linked to their heat and electricity outputs. Indeed, as HPs produce heat from
electricity purchased in the electricity market, their variable heat production cost is proportional
to their electricity consumption. Similarly, as CHPs simultaneously produce heat and electricity,
their variable production cost can be represented by a linear function of their heat and electricity
production. Due to the strong linkage between the heat and electricity production of CHPs, the cost
allocation between heat and electricity production is not straightforward. A common approach in
the literature to define the variable heat production cost of CHPs is to subtract revenues earned by
electricity sales from their total variable production cost (Pinson et al. 2017, Mitridati and Pinson
2016).
2.3. Interdependencies in a market environment
In order to achieve an efficient dispatch for the whole system while ensuring their profitability, the
bids of CHPs and HPs in heat and electricity markets must implicitly reflect their techno-economic
characteristics. In particular, the bids of CHPs and HPs in the heat market must reflect their
marginal heat production cost. Due to the linkage between their heat and electricity outputs and
costs, CHPs and HPs must anticipate their day-ahead electricity dispatch and electricity market
prices in order to accurately compute their marginal heat production cost. As the heat-to-power
ratio of HPs is considered fixed and given by their COP, the marginal heat production cost of HPs is
proportional to the foreseen electricity market prices. Unlike HPs, the heat-to-power ratio of CHPs
is variable, and therefore, their marginal heat production cost must be computed at the optimal
heat-to-power ratio given the heat production and expected electricity market prices. Therefore, for
low electricity market prices, the marginal heat production cost of CHPs represents the incremental
heat production cost at the minimum heat-to-power ratio and, for high electricity market prices, it
represents the opportunity loss of producing an extra unit of heat at the maximum heat-to-power
ratio. The formulation of these marginal heat production costs as convex piece-wise linear functions
of electricity prices is provided in the online appendix, available at Mitridati et al. (2020b). This
cost allocation method allows CHPs and HPs to implicitly model the linkage between their heat
and electricity outputs and costs. However, the heat market clearing is myopic to the impacts of
the heat dispatch of CHPs and HPs on the electricity market clearing and, in turn, to the impact of
electricity market prices on the marginal heat production cost and profitability of CHPs and HPs
in the heat market (Virasjoki et al. 2018).
Once their heat dispatch for each hour of the following day is fixed, CHPs and HPs can participate
in the day-ahead electricity market (Nordpool 2019). Due to the strong linkage between their heat
and electricity outputs and costs, the bids of CHPs and HPs in the electricity market are dependent
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on their day-ahead heat dispatch and commitment. Indeed, the minimum and maximum electricity
production of CHPs as well as the inflexible electricity consumption of HPs are functions of their
heat dispatch. As CHPs and HPs are required to produce the heat dispatched in the day-ahead
heat market, they must self-commit their minimum electricity production and inflexible electricity
consumption in the electricity market. The expression of the adjusted electricity output bounds of
CHPs and HPs, based on their day-ahead heat dispatch and commitment, is provided in Section 4.
This heat-driven dispatch limits the flexibility of CHPs and HPs in the electricity market, which
may negatively impact the integration of renewable energy sources and electricity market prices
(Chen et al. 2015).
3. Towards an electricity-aware heat unit commitment model
As discussed in Section 2, the current sequential heat and electricity market-clearing frameworks do
not effectively take into account the interdependencies between the energy systems. As a result, the
heat market clearing does not take advantage of the flexibility in the district heating network and is
myopic to the impact of the heat dispatch on the power system. In this context, the unit commitment
decisions and time delays in the district heating network may have a strong impact on the efficient
operation of both heat and power systems, and the profitability of CHPs and HPs at the interface
between them. In order to address these challenges, our goal is to design an electricity-aware heat
unit commitment model which (i) accurately models the techno-economic characteristics of the units
at the interface between heat and power systems, such as CHPs and HPs, and (ii) coordinates their
market participation in order to improve the sequential clearing of heat and electricity markets.
3.1. Electricity awareness through bid-validity constraints
As discussed above, the interdependencies between the heat and electricity outputs of a CHP or
HP j ∈ IH impact its marginal heat production costs Γ˙Hjt. Hence its bids in heat markets should
account for these interdependencies. We propose to do so through bid-validity constraints. These
constraints guarantee that the bidding price cHjbt of all selected bids are greater than or equal to the
marginal heat production cost of the units, i.e.,(
cHjbt−Mj
)
ubidjbt ≥ Γ˙Hjt−Mj, ∀j ∈ IH, t∈ T , b∈BH, (1)
where Mj is an upper bound on the marginal heat production costs of CHPs and HPs, and ubidjbt ∈
{0,1} are the commitment decisions on the bids submitted by CHPs and HPs, such that ubidjbt = 1 if
and only if bid b is selected in the heat market. Therefore, (1) guarantees that a necessary condition
for a bid b to be selected, i.e., ubidjbt = 1, is that the bidding price is greater than or equal to the
marginal heat production cost of this unit, i.e., cHjbt ≥ Γ˙Hjt. Note that, for ubidjbt = 0, (1) simply enforces
the upper bound, i.e., Mj ≥ Γ˙Hjt.
Mitridati, Van Hentenryck, and Kazempour: Electricity-Aware Heat Unit Commitment
Article submitted to INFORMS Journal on Optimization 7
Lemma 1. Consider a heat market participant connected to the electricity market zone z ∈ ZE,
denoted by j ∈ IHz , whose marginal heat production cost Γ˙Hjt can be expressed as a convex piece-wise
linear function of the electricity market prices λEzt, for all t ∈ T . The bid-validity constraints (1)
can be equivalently reformulated as a set of linear constraints, i.e.,
Abidj u
bid
j +B
bid
j λ
E
z ≥ bbidj ,∀j ∈ IHz , (2)
where ubidj =
[
ubidjbt,∀t∈ T , b∈BH
]
denotes the vector of selected bids for market participant j. Fur-
thermore, λEz = [λEzt,∀t∈ T ] is the vector of electricity market prices in zone z, and matrices Abidj ,
Bbidj and vector bbidj are fixed techno-economic parameters of market participant j.
The expression of the matrices Abidj , Bbidj and vector bbidj and proof of Lemma 1 can directly be
derived by replacing the marginal heat production cost Γ˙Hjt in (1) by a convex piece-wise linear
function, as shown in the online appendix, available at Mitridati et al. (2020b). In particular, the
expression of the convex piece-wise linear heat marginal costs of CHPs and HPs is detailed.
3.2. A novel electricity-aware heat bid format
The bid-validity constraints described in Lemma 1 can alternatively be interpreted as a novel bid
format that allows CHPs and HPs to offer their heat price-quantity bids {cHjbt, sHjbt} conditionally
on electricity market prices. This new bid format is defined below.
Definition 1 (Electricity-aware heat bid format). For each heat market participant j ∈
IH and time step t ∈ T , an electricity-aware heat bid b ∈ BH is defined as a price-quantity pair
{cHjbt, sHjbt} associated with bounds {λEjbt, λ
E
jbt} on electricity market prices for which this bid is
considered valid.
These electricity market price bounds, i.e., λEjbt and λ
E
jbt, can be computed by market participants
based on the expression of their marginal heat production costs Γ˙jt. Note that, for heat market
participants whose heat marginal production costs are independent on electricity market prices,
these bounds simply represent the price floor λEz and the price cap λ
E
z in the underlying electricity
market zone z.
Proposition 1. Consider a heat market participant j ∈ IHz whose marginal heat production cost
Γ˙Hjt is expressed as a convex piece-wise linear function of electricity market prices λEzt. Without the
need for bounds {λEjbt, λ
E
jbt}, the electricity-aware bids of this heat participant can equivalently be
expressed as price-quantity pairs {cHjbt, sHjbt} and bid-validity constraints (1).
The proof of Proposition 1 is provided in the online appendix, available at Mitridati et al. (2020b).
The proposed electricity-aware heat bid format can be implemented in the current sequential
market framework without major regulatory and organizational changes, by introducing additional
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linear bid-validity constraints in the heat unit commitment problem. In addition, this electricity-
aware approach provides CHPs and HPs with greater flexibility to take into account their techno-
economic characteristics and the linkage between their heat and electricity outputs in the current
sequential market design.
3.3. A hierarchical trilevel optimization for electricity-aware heat unit commitment
The proposed model is built upon a Stackelberg game with a single leader and multiple followers.
The leader is the heat unit commitment problem that determines the on/off commitment decisions
in the heat sector, while anticipating the reaction of the followers, i.e., the sequential heat and
electricity market-clearing problems. The action of the leader constrains the reaction of the follower,
and, in return, the reaction of the followers impact the objective function of the leader. In our
case, the commitment decisions of heat producers impact the sequential heat and electricity market-
clearing problems. In return, the heat dispatch of CHPs and HPs impacts the operating cost of the
heat system in the heat unit commitment problem. Additionally, electricity market prices impact
the marginal heat production costs and the profitability of CHPs and HPs. This is accounted for in
the heat unit commitment problem in the form of bid-validity constraints (2).
Assuming the availability of perfect information on the input data within the heat and electricity
market-clearing problem, our proposed model results in a hierarchical trilevel optimization prob-
lem, whose structure is illustrated in Figure 1. The upper-level problem represents the heat unit
commitment problem, which is constrained by the lower-level optimization problem. The lower-
level problem will be modeled as a bilevel optimization model, representing the sequential heat and
electricity market-clearing problem. The next subsection further explains it.
Figure 1 The hierarchical structure of the proposed electricity-aware heat unit commitment model.
3.4. A closer look at the lower-level problem
As illustrated by Figure 1, the lower-level problem in the proposed electricity-aware heat unit com-
mitment model represents the sequential heat and electricity market-clearing problem. Different
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approaches have been studied in the literature to model such sequential and interdependent mar-
ket clearings (Pineda and Morales 2016). Traditionally, these markets have been modelled as an
equilibrium problem, where the electricity market-clearing problem takes as input the optimal so-
lutions of the heat market-clearing problem, as illustrated in Figure 2(a). It is worth noting that
this formulation of the lower-level problem is not a bilevel optimization problem. Rather, both the
heat and electricity market-clearing problems are lower-level problems for the upper-level problem
in Figure 1. However, the dual formulation of this sequential market-clearing model contains non-
convex bilinear terms, making the solution of the whole electricity-aware heat unit commitment
model computationally challenging.
Figure 2 The structure of the sequential heat and electricity market clearings as (a) an equilibrium problem, (b) a
bilevel problem proposed by Pineda and Morales (2016), and (c) a bilevel problem proposed by this paper.
In order to address these challenges, Pineda and Morales (2016) proposed an interesting alter-
native that models these sequential market clearings in the lower-level problem as a bilevel opti-
mization problem, whose leader is the electricity market-clearing problem, and whose follower is
the heat market-clearing problem. This alternative is illustrated in Figure 2(b). With this setup,
the electricity market-clearing problem becomes the middle-level problem of the electricity-aware
heat unit commitment model, while the heat market-clearing problem becomes the lower-level prob-
lem. Despite its computational tractability, this alternative has its own shortcoming. Indeed, these
equilibrium (Figure 2(a)) and bilevel (Figure 2(b)) formulations are not equivalent. In the bilevel
formulation proposed in Pineda and Morales (2016), the electricity market in the middle level is able
to anticipate the outcomes of the heat market in the lower level, and, in case of multiple solutions
to the lower-level problem, to choose the opptimistic solution which minimizes its own objective.
Due to the sequential order of these market clearings, this formulation is not realistic.
We propose a third alternative, which is also a bilevel optimization model. However, the middle-
level problem represents the heat market clearing, which is constrained by the electricity market
clearing in the lower level, as illustrated in Figure 2(c). Therefore, the electricity market in the lower
level is constrained by the solutions of the heat market in the middle level.
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Proposition 2. The proposed bilevel formulation of the sequential heat and electricity market
clearings, in which the middle-level problem represents the heat market clearing and the lower-level
problem represents the electricity market clearing, as illustrated in Figure 2(c), is equivalent to the
equilibrium formulation of these sequential market clearings, as illustrated in Figure 2(a).
A proof of Proposition 2 is provided in the online appendix, available at Mitridati et al. (2020b).
Furthermore, the main advantage of the proposed bilevel formulation is it computational tractability,
as it will be discussed in Section 4.
As a result, the proposed electricity-aware heat unit commitment model is formulated a trilevel
optimization problem, in which the middle-level problem represents the heat market clearing, and
the lower-level problem represents the electricity market clearing.
4. Formulation of the proposed trilevel optimization problem
By convention, any set indexed by an electricity market zone z ∈ZE or a district heating network
node n∈NH represents the subset located/connected to this zone or node. Furthermore, all variables
and vectors of variables in the heat unit commitment, and day-ahead heat and electricity market
clearings are represented in bold. A full list of notation is provided below. In particular, this list
defines the variable sets ΩUC, ΩH and ΩE corresponding to the variable set of upper-, middle- and
lower-level problems, respectively.
4.1. Upper level: Electricity-aware heat unit commitment
The proposed electricity-aware heat unit commitment problem in the upper-level problem seeks
to minimize the operating cost of the heat system for each hour of the following day t ∈ T , while
anticipating the impact of its decisions on the heat market-clearing problem in the middle level
and the electricity market-clearing problem in the lower level. The set of decision variables ΩUC of
the heat unit commitment problem includes the commitment state u0jt, validity ubidjbkt of all heat
bids k ∈ {1, ...,BH}, start-up v↑jt and shut-down v↓jt states, and start-up costs rjt of each heat
producer j ∈ IH, flow direction −→u nmt and time delay Φnmt between nodes n ∈NH,m ∈NHn of the
district heating network. The upper-level problem receives feedback on the outcomes of the heat and
electricity market-clearing problems, including the heat dispatch QHjbkt of all bids and the electricity
prices λEzt in each market zone z ∈ZE that are needed to ensure the validity of all bids. Therefore,
the electricity-aware heat unit commitment problem writes as
min
ΩUC∪ΩH∪{λEzt}
∑
t∈T
∑
j∈IH
c0jtu0jt + rjt + BH∑
k=1
cHjbktQjbkt
 (3a)
s.t. rjt ≥ c↑jh
(
u0jt−
t∑
k=t−h
u0jk
)
,∀j ∈ IH, t∈ T \Φu,initj , h∈Φrjt (3b)
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rjt ≥ 0,∀j ∈ IH, t∈ T (3c)
u0jt = u
init
jt ,∀j ∈ IH, t∈Φu,initj (3d)
t∑
k=t−Φ↑j+1
v↑jk ≤u0jt,∀j ∈ IH, t∈ T \Φu,initj (3e)
t∑
k=t−Φ↓j+1
v↑jk ≤ 1−u0j(t−Φ↓
j
)
,∀j ∈ IH, t∈ T \Φu,initj (3f)
v↑jt −v↓jt =u0jt−u0j(t−1),∀j ∈ IH, t∈ T \Φu,initj (3g)
ubidjbkt ≤ubidjbk−1t,∀j ∈ IH, t∈ T , k ∈ {1, ...,BH} (3h)
Φnmt =
Φ∑
k=0
kuΦnmtk,∀n∈NH,m∈NHn , t∈ T (3i)
Φ∑
k=0
uΦnmtk = 1,∀n∈NH,m∈NHn , t∈ T (3j)
−→u nmt +−→u mnt = 1,∀n∈NH,m∈NHn , t∈ T (3k)
v↑jt ,v
↓
jt,u
0
jt,u
bid
jbkt
∈ {0,1},∀j ∈ IH, k ∈ {1, ...,BH}, t∈ T (3l)
−→u nmt,uΦnmtk ∈ {0,1},∀n∈NH,m∈NHn , k ∈ {0, ...,Φ}, t∈ T (3m)
Bid-validity constraints (2) (3n)
{Qjbkt,λEzt} ∈ solutions of (4). (3o)
The upper-level objective function (3a) minimizes the heat system operating cost, which includes
start-up costs rjt, no-load costs c0jt, and the cost of dispatching heat bids, i.e., cHjbkt. Constraints (3b)
and (3c) model the start-up cost depending on the time the generation units have been offline. The
expression
(
u0jt−
∑t
k=t−hu
0
jk
)
in (3b) is equal to 1 when unit j becomes online after it has been
turned off for h time periods. Constraint (3d) fixes the initial minimum up- and down-time of the
generation units. Constraints (3e) and (3f) enforce the minimum up- and down-time, respectively. In
particular, (3e) states that a generation unit has to remain on if it has been turned on less than Φ↑j
time steps ago, i.e., if v↑jk = 1 for k > t−Φ↑j . Similarly, (3f) states that a generation unit cannot be
turned on, i.e., v↑jk = 0 for k > t−Φ↓j , if it has been turned on less than Φ↓j time steps ago. Constraint
(3g) states the relationship between the binary variables for the on/off, start-up, and shut-down
statuses of each unit. Constraint (3h) ensures that a bid bk+1 is selected only if the previous bid bk
has been selected. Constraints (3i) and (3j) define the discrete time delays Φnmt between the nodes
of the heat network, such that Φnmt = k if and only if the binary variable uΦnmtk = 1. Constraint (3k)
states the relationship between the direction of the heat flows between two connected nodes of the
district heating network, where −→u nmt = 1 if and only if the flow entering the pipeline at time step t
is directed from node n to node m. Furthermore, (3n) represents the linear bid-validity constraints
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for all heat market participants, whose marginal heat production costs are expressed as convex
piece-wise linear functions of electricity market prices. This ensures that a bid can be selected only
if its price is greater than or equal to the marginal heat production cost of the corresponding unit.
In particular, the expression of these piece-wise linear marginal heat production costs for CHPs and
HPs is provided in the online appendix, available at Mitridati et al. (2020b). Finally, (3o) represents
the feedback from the primal and dual solutions of the middle- and lower-level problems.
4.2. Middle level: heat market clearing
For given values of the selected bids, heat flow directions and heat time delays determined in the
upper-level problem, the middle-level problem clears the day-ahead heat market. The set of middle-
level variables ΩH includes the dispatch of all submitted bids Qjbkt, as well as inlet f
in
nmt and
outlet foutnmt heat flows between nodes of the district heating network. In addition, the heat market
computes the adjusted minimum and maximum electricity outputs P jt, P jt of CHPs, and the
electricity consumption LHPjt of HPs. The middle-level problem is
min
ΩH∪{λEzt}
∑
t∈T
∑
j∈IH
BH∑
k=1
cHjbktQjbkt (4a)
s.t.
∑
j∈IHn
Qjt +
∑
m∈NHn
(
foutmnt−f innmt
)
=LHnt,∀n∈NH, t∈ T (4b)
Qjt =
BH∑
k=1
Qjbkt,∀j ∈ IH, t∈ T (4c)
sHj u
0
jt ≤Qjt,∀j ∈ IH, t∈ T (4d)
sHjbktu
bid
jbk+1t
≤Qjbkt ≤ sHjbktubidjbkt,∀j ∈ IH, t∈ T , k ∈ {1, ...,BH− 1} (4e)
Qjb
BHt
≤ sHjb
BH t
ubidjb
BHt
,∀j ∈ IH, t∈ T (4f)
foutnmt =
Phi∑
k=0
Kjtkf
in
nm(t−k)u
Φ
ptk,∀n∈NH,m∈NHn , t∈ T (4g)
0≤ f innmt ≤ f
H
nmt,∀n∈NH,m∈NHn , t∈ T (4h)
LHPjt =
Qjt
COPj
,∀j inIHP, t∈ T (4i)
P jt ≥
F j − ρHj Qjt
ρEj
u0jt,∀j ∈ ICHP, t∈ T (4j)
P jt ≥ rjQjt,∀j ∈ ICHP, t∈ T (4k)
P jt =
F j − ρHj Qjt
ρEj
u0jt,∀j ∈ ICHP, t∈ T (4l)
{λEzt} ∈ dual solution of (5). (4m)
The middle-level objective function (4a) minimizes the operating cost of the heat system for given
valid bids submitted by the heat market participants. Constraint (4b) enforces the heat balance at
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each node of the district heating network. Constraint (4c) defines the total heat production of each
market participant as the sum of its bids dispatched. Constraint (4d) provides a lower bound on the
heat production, for the commitment decision u0jt fixed in the upper-level problem (3). Constraints
(4e) and (4f) enforce the heat production bounds for all heat bids bk, based on the validity ubidjbkt of
the bids selected in the upper-level problem (3). These constraints impose that if the following bid
bk+1 is selected, bid bk should fully be dispatched. Constraint (4g) defines the outlet heat flow in
each pipeline as a function of the inlet heat flow and the discrete time delay variables uΦnmtk fixed in
the upper-level problem (3). Constraint (4h) restricts the heat flow entering each pipeline based on
the direction of the flow −→u nmt fixed in the upper-level problem (3). Furthermore, (4i) computes the
electricity consumption of HPs based on their heat dispatch, (4j) and (4k) the minimum electricity
production of CHPs, and (4l) the maximum electricity production of CHPs. These constraints model
the interdependencies between the heat and electricity outputs of CHPs and HPs, and ensure that
their electricity dispatch is feasible with respect to their heat dispatch and commitment. Note that
the bilinear terms Qjtu0jt in (4l) are a product of continuous and binary variables, and therefore,
they can be exactly linearized using McCormick envelopes. Finally, the electricity market clearing
is represented as the lower-level problem in (4m). Although the solutions of the lower-level problem
do not appear in the objective function or constraints of the middle-level problem, they provide
feedback on the electricity prices λEzt to the upper-level problem (3).
4.3. Lower level: electricity market clearing
The lower-level problem represents the day-ahead electricity market clearing, for given values of
the adjusted electricity bids of CHPs and HPs computed in the middle-level problem (4). The set
of electricity market variables ΩE includes the dispatch Pjb˜kt of all electricity bids k ∈ {1, ..,NE},
and the electricity transfers fEzz˜t between market zones z ∈ZE and z˜ ∈ZEz . The lower-level problem
reads as
min
ΩE
∑
t∈T
∑
j∈IE
BE∑
k=1
cE
jb˜kt
Pjb˜kt (5a)
s.t.
∑
j∈IEz
Pjt =L
E
zt +
∑
j∈IHPz
LHPjt +
∑
z˜∈ZEz
fEzz˜t,∀z ∈ZE, t∈ T (5b)
Pjt =
BE∑
k=1
Pjbkt,∀j ∈ IE, t∈ T (5c)
0≤Pjb˜kt ≤ sEjb˜kt,∀j ∈ I
E, k ∈ {1, ...,BE}, t∈ T (5d)
P jt ≤Pjt ≤P jt,∀j ∈ ICHP, t∈ T (5e)
sEjt ≤Pjt,∀j ∈ IE \ ICHP, t∈ T (5f)
−ATCzz˜t ≤ fEz˜zt ≤ATCzz˜t,∀z ∈ZE, z˜ ∈ZEz t∈ T (5g)
fEzz˜t =−fEz˜zt,∀z ∈ZE, z˜ ∈ZEz , t∈ T . (5h)
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The lower-level objective function (5a) minimizes the operating cost of the power system. Con-
straint (5b) imposes the power balance in each electricity market zone, for the inflexible electricity
consumption of HPs LHPjt fixed in the middle-level problem (4). Constraint (5c) sets the total elec-
tricity production of each market participant as the sum of its bids dispatched. Constraint (5d)
provides bounds on the electricity production of each bid for CHPs and other electricity market
participants. Constraints (5e) and (5f) set the minimum and maximum self-committed electricity
production of CHPs and other electricity market participants, respectively. Constraint (5g) limits
the power exchanged between the electricity market zones, whereas (5h) links the directed power
exchanged between these market zones. Finally, the electricity zonal prices λEzt are defined as the
dual variables of the balance equations (5b).
4.4. Reformulation as a single-level optimization problem
The electricity-aware heat unit commitment problem introduced above can be formulated in a
compact way as the following linear trilevel optimization problem:
min
z∈{0,1}N
xH≥0,yE
c0
>
z+ cH
>
xH (6a)
s.t. z ∈ZUC (6b)
Abidz+BbidyE ≥ bbid (6c)
xH,yE ∈ solutions of min
xH,yE≥0
cH
>
xH (6d)
s.t. AHxH +BHz ≥ bH (6e)
yE ∈ dual sol. of min
xE≥0
cE
>
xE (6f)
s.t. AExE +BExH ≥ bE, (6g)
where z represents the vector of primal variables of the upper-level problem (3), xH represents the
vector of primal variables of the middle-level problem (4), and (xE,yE) represent the vectors of
primal and dual variables of the lower-level problem (5). The expression of the feasible space ZUC,
the vectors (c0, bbid, cH, bH, cE, bE) and matrices (Abid,Bbid,AH,BH,AE,BE) of parameters can be
derives from the detailed formulations of problems (3) to (5).
In this section, we explain how the proposed electricity-aware heat unit commitment model,
formulated as trilevel optimization problem (6), can be reformulated as a single-level MILP. To this
purpose, we need to reformulate the middle- and lower-level problems as a linear program. Notice,
that the objective function (6d) and constraints (6e) of the middle-level problem do not depend
on the lower-level primal and dual variables, xE and yE. This implies that the solutions of the
middle-level problem are not affected by the solutions of the lower-level problem. This allows solving
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bilevel problem (6d)-(6g) in two steps: (i) solve the middle-level problem and obtain the optimal
solutions xH
∗
, (ii) solve the lower-level problem with xH fixed to the values xH
∗
and obtain the
optimal solutions yE
∗
. We approximate the middle- and lower-level problems by a single-level linear
program using a lexicographic function (Byeon and Van Hentenryck 2020). The electricity-aware
unit commitment problem can then be reformulated as a single-level MILP, exploiting the strong
duality of such an approximation of the middle- and lower-level problems.
Proposition 3. The trilevel optimization problem (6) can be asymptotically approximated by the
following single-level MILP:
min
z∈{0,1}N,xH≥0
xE≥0,yH,yE
γc0
>
z+ γcH
>
xH + (1− γ) cE>xE (7a)
s.t. z ∈ZUC (7b)
Abidz+
1
(1− γ)B
bidyE ≥ bbid (7c)
AHxH +BHz ≥ bH (7d)
AExE +BExH ≥ bE (7e)
yH
>
AH +yE
>
BE ≤ γcH> (7f)
yE
>
AE ≤ (1− γ) cE> (7g)
yH
> (
bH−BHz)+yE>bE ≥ γcH>xH + (1− γ) cE>xE. (7h)
When the penalty factor γ tends to 1, the solutions of (7) converge to the solutions of (6).
The proof of Proposition 3 is provided in the online appendix, available at Mitridati et al. (2020b).
Note that the bilinear terms in (7h) can be linearized using an exact McCormick relaxation (Mc-
Cormick 1976).
5. Numerical analyses with two case studies
This section illustrates the benefits of the proposed electricity-aware heat unit commitment model
in terms of renewable energy penetration, cost-effectiveness, and profitability of CHPs and HPs,
through two case studies. We compare the proposed electricity-aware heat unit commitment model
to a traditional decoupled heat unit commitment model, which seeks to minimize the heat unit
commitment and dispatch cost (6a), constrained by unit commitment and time delays constraints
(6b), as well as feasibility of the heat bids and heat balance at each node (6e). Contrary to the
proposed electricity-aware heat unit commitment model, this decoupled unit commitment model is
myopic to the impact of the commitment of CHPs and HPs on the electricity market, and in turn
the impact of electricity market prices on the feasibility of heat bids.
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Figure 3 Case study 1: Modified IEEE 24-node power system with 6 wind farms (the bottom system) connected to
two isolated 3-node district heating systems (the two systems on the top of the figure)
5.1. Case study 1: modified IEEE 24-node power system
We first compare the two heat unit commitment models based on a 24-node power system, which is
connected to two isolated 3-node district heating systems. We consider a 24-hour time horizon. This
small test case represents an energy system with a particularly high penetration of wind production,
as well as a large share of CHPs and HPs, which can provide operational flexibility at the interface
between heat and power systems.
Input data and setup: The modified version of the IEEE 24-node power system consists of
twelve thermal power plants, six wind farms, two extraction CHPs, and two HPs, as illustrated in
Figure 3.
Each node of the power system is considered to represent an electricity market zone. Data for
power generation, costs, ATCs between the nodes, and loads for the IEEE 24-node power system
is derived from Ordoudis et al. (2016). Additionally, spatially and temporally correlated profiles of
wind power generation at six locations are derived from Bukhsh et al. (2016), and provided online
at Bukhsh (2020).
Each district heating network consists of one CHP, one waste incinerator heat-only (HO) unit, one
heat-only peak boiler, and one large-scale heat pump each. The techno-economic characteristics of
these units are derived from Zugno et al. (2016), Li et al. (2016), Mitridati and Taylor (2018). Heat
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Figure 4 Case study 1: Heat dispatch in the first district heating network with (a) decoupled, and (b) proposed
electricity-aware heat unit commitment models (CHP: combined heat and power unit; HP: heat pump unit; HO:
heat-only unit)
load profiles are derived from Madsen (2015). For simplicity and to compare the commitment and
dispatch results with both unit commitment models hour-by-hour, time delays in pipelines are fixed
to zero. The impact of varying time delays is discussed in details in Mitridati and Taylor (2018).
Although the two district heating networks are technically similar, they connect to different nodes
of power system, and therefore, they are expected to have different unit commitment and dispatch
results. The heat bids and no-load costs of CHPs and HPs are computed using the average electricity
market prices at the nodes of the power system to which they are connected (Ordoudis et al. 2016).
At day-time hours, i.e., between hours 7 to 20, the average electricity market price is $5.9/MWh
at the nodes connected to the first district heating network, while it is $11.3/MWh at the nodes
connected to the second district heating network. This price is $0/MWh at night-time hours for all
nodes.
Finally, the penalty factor γ in (7) is fixed to 0.99. A sensitivity analysis reveals that solutions
are stable around this value, and therefore, are assumed to have converged.
Results: As expected, the heat dispatch in both district heating networks are vastly different,
despite their identical techno-economic characteristics, due to their interdependencies with the power
system, as illustrated in Figures 4 and 5. Indeed, the difference in electricity market prices between
the nodes of the power system to which the district heating networks are connected result in different
bids and merit orders. In the first district heating network, due to low average electricity market
prices at night-time hours, the heat pump HP1 offers at the lowest prices, followed by CHP1, the
waste incinerator HO1, and the peak heat boiler HO2. Moreover, due to high average electricity
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Figure 5 Case study 1: Heat dispatch in the second district heating network with (a) decoupled, and (b) proposed
electricity-aware heat unit commitment models (CHP: combined heat and power unit; HP: heat pump unit; HO:
heat-only unit)
market prices at day-time hours, CHP1 is cheaper than HP1. Whereas, in the second district heating
network, due to lower average electricity market prices, the heat pump HP2 offers at the lowest
prices at each hour of the day, followed by CHP2, the waste incinerator HO3, and the peak heat
boiler HO4. These merit orders are directly reflected in the heat dispatch of the decoupled model in
Figures 4(a) and 5(a). However, this myopic heat unit commitment and dispatch results in electricity
market prices which do not support cost-recovery for CHP1 at night-time hours and between hours
14 and 15, and for CHP2 at each hour of the day. Indeed, during these hours their true heat marginal
costs, computed based on the realized electricity market prices, are higher than their submitted
bids. This results in a financial loss of $4,389 for CHP1 and $5,620 for CHP2.
By anticipating the impact of the commitment and dispatch of these CHPs on the electricity
market clearing and prices, the proposed electricity-aware model rejects the bids of CHP1 and
CHP2 during these hours, and switches heat production to the waste incinerators HO1 and HO3,
as observed in Figures 4(b) and 5(b). This bid-validity approach provides a better representation
of the techno-economic characteristics of CHPs and HPs at the interface between heat and power
systems, which ensures their profitability in the current sequential market design.
Additionally, this electricity-aware heat dispatch provides greater operational flexibility to CHPs
and HPs in the electricity-market, which results in higher wind utilization. In particular, the com-
mitment and dispatch of CHP1 and CHP2 at night-time hours, in the decoupled model results
in high wind curtailment, as illustrated in Figure 6. By switching heat production to the waste
incinerators HO1 and HO3, the proposed model reduces wind curtailment by 6% over the day.
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Figure 6 Case study 1: Wind production and curtailment with (a) decoupled, and (b) proposed electricity-aware
heat unit commitment models
Table 1 Case study 1: Heat, electricity and overall energy systems commitment and dispatch costs, in 103$, and
wind curtailment in the power system, as a percentage of the available wind power production.
Decoupled Electricity-aware Difference
Overall system cost (103$) 183.0 141.2 −23%
Heat system cost (103$) 85.6 103.3 +21%
Power system cost (103$) 97.4 37.9 −67%
Wind curtailment (%) 20.4 14.3 −6%
As a result, the proposed model reduces the operating cost in the overall energy system by 23%
and in the power system by 67% compared to the decoupled model, as summarized in Table 1.
Besides, the electricity-aware heat unit commitment model rejects heat bids with low prices because
they violate bid-validity constraints, i.e., the submitted bids are lower than the units’ foreseen
marginal heat production costs. Therefore, as expected, the proposed model achieves a higher heat
system operating cost, which is computed based on the submitted bids, than the decoupled model.
5.2. Case study 2: Danish energy system
We now compare the two heat unit commitment models on a realistic case study representing the
Danish heat and power systems over 1 year of operation.
Input data and setup: As illustrated in Figure 7, the Danish power system is divided into two
market zones, DK1 and DK2, connected via an interconnection. Generation costs and parameters,
ATCs, as well as electricity loads, wind and solar power generation for 1 year are available on the
website of Danish power system operator, Energinet.dk (Energinet.dk 2020) as well as Tosatto and
Chatzivasileiadis (2020). All these power data are also publicly provided online at Mitridati et al.
(2020b).
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Figure 7 Case study 2: Danish electricity market zones (DK1 and DK2) and three district heating networks
(Aarhus, Copenhagen, TVIS). Red zones represent areas with high density of district heating consumption. Red arrow
represents the interconnection between the two electricity market zones.
Additionally, we consider three disconnected district heating networks, which geographically cover,
respectively, the greater Copenhagen area, Aarhus area, and the multicity TVIS area (Fredericia,
Middelfart, Kolding and Vejle). These district heating networks comprise 11 CHPs, 6 incinerators
(IS), i.e., CHPs with fixed heat-electricity ratio, 6 HPs, 20 HO units and peak boilers, and 3 heat
storage tanks (HS). Heat load profiles for 1 year, generation costs, and technical parameters for
these district heating networks are derived from Madsen (2015), Mitridati and Taylor (2018) and
the website of Danish power system operator, Energinet.dk (Energinet.dk 2020). All these heat data
are now publicly provided online at Mitridati et al. (2020b).
Both heat unit commitment models, i.e., decoupled unit commitment and electricity-aware unit
commitment, are solved daily over 1 year. Each day, the hourly heat bids and no-load costs of CHPs,
incinerators, and HPs are computed using the expected electricity market prices at the nodes of
the power system to which they are connected, as discussed in Section 2. Based on these bids, the
heat unit commitment, followed by the heat and then electricity markets are cleared for each hour
of the following day. The commitment and energy storage capacity at the end of the day, are used
to initialize the commitment and dispatch decisions the following day. In order to ensure that heat
storage in pipelines and heat storage tanks is not depleted throughout the day, the energy stored
at the end of each day is valued, based on the average marginal production cost of all units for that
day, in the objective function.
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Table 2 Case study 2: Heat, electricity and overall energy systems commitment and dispatch costs, in 106$, and
renewable energy utilization in the power system, as a percentage of the available production.
Decoupled Electricity-aware Difference
Overall system cost∗ (106$) 1,967 1,881 −4.4%
Heat system cost (106$) 1,360 1,287 −5.4%
Power system cost (106$) 608 594 −2.2%
Renewable utilization (%) 95.9 96.3 +0.4%
Figure 8 Case study 2: (a) Daily heat dispatch (in MWh) of CHPs with decoupled and electricity-aware unit
commitment models over 1 year, and (b) corresponding financial losses (in e) with the decoupled unit commitment
model.
Results: The simulation of the sequential operation of the heat and power systems over 1 year
with both heat unit commitment models shows that the proposed electricity-aware unit commitment
model is able to efficiently anticipate the impact of the commitment decisions of CHPs and HPs on
the electricity market. As summarized in Table 2, the proposed model achieves lower heat, electricity
and overall system costs compared to the decoupled approach. This is achieved by switching off
certain CHPs during extended periods of low electricity market prices and when their bids are
invalid. For instance, as illustrated in Figure 8(a) the bids of CHP6 are rejected by the electricity-
aware unit commitment model because they are invalid, and CHP5 is used to partially cover this
heat production, despite offering more expensive bids. While, for a given hour, this rejected bid may
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Table 3 Case study 2: Number of hours for which invalid bids are selected by the decoupled unit commitment
model, and the resulting financial losses for each unit.
Nb. of hours Financial losses (103 e)
CHP1 3989 −20,364
CHP2 2638 −3,081
CHP3 3192 −10,668
CHP4 4784 −6,683
CHP5 20 −148
CHP6 3078 −17,203
CHP7 2256 −7,534
CHP8 1503 −5,140
CHP9 3212 −7,531
CHP10 3161 −7,395
CHP11 1457 −5,839
IS1 7472 −6,620
IS2 7220 −6,717
IS3 0 0
IS4 3195 −8,092
IS5 6899 −11,918
IS6 4135 −6,739
HP1 1920 −787
HP2 2669 −2,086
HP3 2669 −348
HP4 594 0
HP5 2146 −379
HP6 1959 −83
be replaced with more expensive bids, over multiple days, this electricity-aware approach yields a
more efficient and less expensive commitment and dispatch in the heat system.
Additionally, as the decoupled unit commitment model fails to anticipate the impact of electricity
market prices on the heat production costs of CHPs and HPs, in the hours where invalid bids
are selected, these units suffer large financial losses, as summarized in Table 3 for each unit. As
illustrated in Figure 8(b) for CHP6, in the days where the electricity-aware unit commitment rejects
invalid bids, the decoupled unit commitment incurs large financial losses by selecting these invalid
bids. These losses are more significant during the winter time due to the higher production level of
CHP6 during these days.
6. Conclusion
This paper provides a novel electricity-aware heat unit commitment model using a trilevel optimiza-
tion problem. This model improves the coordination between heat and and power systems through
bid-validity constraints, while respecting the current sequential market design. This approach can
also be understood as a market mechanism for the coordination of heat and power systems, which
allows CHPs and HPs to offer electricity-aware heat bids which are conditional on electricity market
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prices. A tractable MILP reformulation for the proposed trilevel optimization problem is developed.
Finally, the value of improving the coordination between heat and power systems is illustrated in
two case studies, one based on the realistic power and heat systems in Denmark. Our simulations
show that the proposed model is able to ensure cost recovery for CHPs and HPs in the heat market,
while reducing the operating cost of the overall energy system by 4.5% compared to a decoupled unit
commitment model. This work allows us to harness and remunerate the flexibility of CHPs and HPs
at the interface between heat and electricity systems, and to achieve an efficient and cost-effective
operation of the overall energy system.
This study opens up various opportunities for future work. Firstly, in the current market frame-
work, the commitment and dispatch of disconnected and independent district heating networks
is solved in a decentralized way. Therefore, decomposition techniques relying on consensus-based
distributed algorithms can be investigated. Recent advances in the literature have introduced per-
formance guarantees on the application of such algorithms to large-scale MILPs (Vujanic et al. 2016,
Dvorkin et al. 2018, Falsone et al. 2019).
Secondly, the proposed model assumes perfect information on the bids of the market participants
and wind power availability in the electricity market clearing. However, such information may not be
communicated by the independent market operator, due to privacy concerns. Therefore, imperfect
information on the parameters of the lower-level problem may be assumed using a scenario-based
stochastic programming framework, or a robust counterpart of the middle- and lower-level problems.
Finally, a privacy-preserving extension of the proposed model can be developed, where differential
privacy on the electricity bids is ensured while preserving feasibility of the market clearing, as
discussed in Fioretto and Van Hentenryck (2018).
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Appendix A: Marginal heat production costs of CHPs and HPs
As the heat-to-power ratio of HPs is considered fixed and given by their COP, the marginal heat production
cost of HPs can be expressed as a linear function of the electricity market prices, such that
Γ˙jt
H
=
∂Γ˙jt
H
∂Qjt
=
λEzt
COPj
,∀z ∈ZE, j ∈ IHPz , t∈ T , (8)
Additionally, as the heat-to-power ratio of CHPs is variable, their heat production cost must be computed
at the optimal heat-to-power ratio, for a given heat production and expected electricity market prices. Typ-
ically, the heat production of CHPs is defined as their total production cost minus revenues from electricity
sales, such that
ΓHjt = cj
(
ρEj Pjt + ρ
H
j Qjt
)−PjtλEzt,∀z ∈ZE, j ∈ IHPz , t∈ T . (9)
where cj (ρEPjt + ρHQjt) represents the total production cost of CHPs as a linear function of their fuel
consumption. Note that this linear cost assumption can be relaxed to assume convex piece-wise linear costs,
without loss of generality. For low electricity market prices the marginal heat production cost of CHPs
represents the incremental heat production cost at the minimum heat-to-power ratio
(
cj
(
ρHj + rjρ
E
j
)− rjλEzt),
and for high electricity market prices it represents the opportunity loss of producing an extra unit of heat
at the maximum heat-to-power ratio
(
λEzt
ρHj
ρEj
)
. Therefore, the marginal heat production cost of CHPs can
be expressed as a convex piece-wise linear function of the electricity prices, such that
Γ˙Hjt = max{λEzt
ρHj
ρEj
, cj
(
ρHj + rjρ
E
j
)− rjλEzt},∀z ∈ZE, j ∈ ICHPz , t∈ T . (10)
Appendix B: Proofs of Propositions
B.1. Proof of Lemma 1
Let us consider a heat market participant j ∈ IHz , whose marginal heat production cost can be expressed as
a convex piece-wise linear function of the electricity market prices, such that
Γ˙Hjt = max
k=1,...,K
{
ajktλ
E
zt + bjkt
}
,∀j ∈ IHz , t∈ T , (11)
where index k ∈ {1, ...,K} represents the segments of the piece-wise linear function. In addition, ajkt ∈R and
bjkt ∈R are parameters. The expression of the segments and parameters in this definition of convex piece-wise
linear functions can be computed by the market participants based on their marginal production costs. For
instance, using this definition, the heat marginal production cost of CHPs in (10), can be formulated as a
piece-wise linear function with two segments, such that
Γ˙Hjt
(
λEzt
)
= max
k∈{1,2}
{
ajktλ
E
zt + bjkt
}
,∀z ∈ZE, j ∈ ICHPz , t∈ T , (12)
where aj1t =
ρHj
ρEj
, bj1t = 0, aj2t = −rj and bj2t = cj
(
ρHj + rjρ
E
j
)
. Note that marginal heat production costs
that are affine (or constant) functions of the electricity prices, such as HPs in (8) (or heat-only units) are
a straightforward special case of convex piece-wise linear functions with one segment (k = 1). Furthermore,
costs that are convex quadratic functions of electricity prices can be approximated using a convex piece-wise
linear function fitting, for any given number of segments.
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As a result, the bid-validity constraints (1) rewrites as(
cHjbt−Mj
)
ubidjbt ≥ ajktλEzt + bjkt−Mj , ∀j ∈ IHz , k ∈ {1, ...,K}, t∈ T , b∈BH. (13)
This linear formulation of the bid-validity constraints (1) can be expressed in a matrix form as
Abidj u
bid
j +B
bid
j λ
E
z ≥ bbidj , ∀j ∈ IHz , (14)
where ubidj =
[
ubidjbt ,∀t∈ T , b∈BH
]
denotes the vector of selected bids for market participant j. Furthermore,
λEz = [λ
E
zt,∀t∈ T ] presents the vector of electricity market prices in zone z, whereas matrices Abidj , Bbidj and
vector bbidj denote fixed techno-economic parameters of market participant j.
B.2. Proof of Proposition 1
Let us consider a heat market participant j ∈ IHz , whose marginal heat production cost can be expressed as
a convex piece-wise linear function of the electricity market prices, such that
Γ˙Hjt = max
k=1,...,K
ajkt{λEzt + bjkt},∀t∈ T , (15)
with ajkt ∈R, and bjkt ∈R fixed parameters. As a result, the bid-validity constraints (1) rewrite as(
cHjbt−Mj
)
ubidjbt ≥ ajktλEzt + bjkt−Mj ,∀j ∈ IHz , k ∈ {1, ...,K}, t∈ T , b∈BH. (16)
Furthermore, we assume that in each electricity market zone z ∈ZE, the set of electricity market prices is
bounded, i.e., λEz ≤λEzt ≤ λ
E
z . This assumption is without loss of generality, as the bidding prices in electricity
market are typically bounded, and bounds on electricity market prices can be derived from these bounds
and the value of lost loads.
We define the minimum λEjbt and maximum λ
E
jbt bounds on electricity market prices for each bid b, such
that
λEjbt =
 max
{
cHjbt− bjkt
ajkt
,∀k ∈ {1, ...,K} | ajkt < 0
}
, if ∃ ajkt < 0
λEz , else
,∀j ∈ IHz , t∈ T , b∈BH (17a)
λ
E
jbt =
 min
{
cHjbt− bjkt
ajkt
,∀k ∈ {1, ...,K} | ajkt > 0
}
, if ∃ ajkt > 0
λ
E
z , else
,∀j ∈ IHz , t∈ T , b∈BH. (17b)
Therefore, bid-validity constraints (16) guarantee that a necessary condition for bid b to be selected, i.e.,
ubidjbt = 1, is that the electricity market price in zone z and time period t is bounded by λ
E
jbt ≤λEzt ≤ λ
E
jbt.
B.3. Proof of Proposition 2
For a given value of the upper-level variables z∗, the equilibrium formulation of the sequential heat and
electricity market-clearing problems can be expressed in a compact form as
xH ∈ primal solution of min
xH≥0
cH
>
xH (18a)
s.t. AHxH +BHz ≥ bH (18b)
yE ∈ dual solution of min
xE≥0
cE
>
xE (18c)
s.t. AExE +BExH ≥ bE, (18d)
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where (18a)-(18b) represent the heat market-clearing problem, and (18c)-(18d) represent the electricity
market-clearing problem. Therefore {xH∗ , yE∗} are optimal solutions to (18) if and only if xH∗ is an optimal
solution to the heat market-clearing problem (18a)-(18b), and yE∗ is an optimal solution to the electricity
market-clearing problem (18c)-(18d) with the variables xH fixed to the values xH∗ .
Similarly, for a given value of the upper-level variables z∗, {xH∗ , yE∗} are solutions to the proposed bilevel
formulation of the sequential heat and electricity market-clearing problems (6d)-(6g), if and only if xH∗ is
an optimal solution to the heat market-clearing problem (6d)-(6e), and yE∗ is an optimal solution to the
electricity market-clearing problem (6f)-(6g) with the variables xH fixed to the values xH∗ .
Therefore, any solutions to the equilibrium problem (18) is equivalent to the bilevel formulation (6d)-(6g),
and these two formulations are equivalent.
B.4. Proof of Proposition 3
Firstly, by strong duality of the linear lower-level problem (6f)-(6g), the middle- and lower-level problems
(6d)-(6g) are equivalent to
xH,yE ∈arg min
xH,yE≥0
cH
>
xH (19a)
s.t. AHxH+ BHz∗ ≥ bH (19b)
yE ∈ arg min
xE,yE≥0
cE
>
xE (19c)
s.t. AExE +BExH ≥ bE (19d)
yE
>
AE ≤ cE> (19e)
yE
> (
BE−BExH)≥ cE>xE. (19f)
Constraint (19e) represents the dual constraints of the lower-level problem (6f)-(6g), i.e., dual feasibility.
Constraint (19f) enforces equality of the primal and dual objective values of the lower-level problem (6f)-(6g)
at optimality (strong duality).
Furthermore, objective function (19a) and constraints (19b) of the middle-level problem do not depend on
the lower-level variables xE and yE. Therefore, the solutions of middle-level optimization problem are not
affected by the solutions of the lower-level problem. Problem (19) can thus be solved in two steps: (i) solve
the heat market-clearing problem (19a)-(19b) and obtain the optimal solutions xH∗ , (ii) solve the electricity
market-clearing problem (19c)-(19f) with the variable xH fixed to xH∗ and obtain the optimal solutions yE∗ .
Therefore, the middle-level problem (19) can be reformulated using a lexicographic function as
xH,yE ∈ arg min
xH,xE,yE≥0
< cH
>
xH, cE
>
xE > (20a)
s.t. AHxH +BHz ≥ bH (20b)
AExE +BExH ≥ bE (20c)
yE
>
AE ≤ cE> (20d)
yE
> (
BE−BExH)≥ cE>xE. (20e)
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Any optimal solution xH∗ , xE∗ , yE∗ of problem (20) satisfies the following properties:
xH
∗ ∈ arg min
xH
cH
>
xH (21a)
s.t. AHxH +BHz ≥ bH, (21b)
and
xE
∗
, yE
∗ ∈ arg min
xE,yE≥0
cE
>
xE (22a)
s.t. AExE +BExH
∗ ≥ bE (22b)
yE
>
AE ≤ cE> (22c)
yE
> (
BE−BExH∗)≥ cE>xE. (22d)
In addition, by strong duality of problem (22), any feasible solution xˆE, yˆE is optimal. Therefore, xˆE is an
optimal solution of the primal formulation of the lower-level problem (6f)-(6g), such that
xˆE ∈ arg min
xE≥0
cE
>
xE (23a)
s.t. AExE +BExH
∗ ≥ bE, (23b)
and yˆE is an optimal solution of the dual formulation of the lower-level problem (6f)-(6g), such that
yˆE ∈ arg max
yE≥0
yE
> (
BE−BExH∗) (24a)
s.t. yE
>
AE ≤ cE> . (24b)
As problem (23) is a relaxation of problem (22) and the set of solutions xˆE, yˆE is feasible to problem (22),
then problem (20) can be approximated by the following linear program, with γ ∈]0,1[:
min
xH,xE≥0
γcH
>
xH + (1− γ) cE>xE (25a)
s.t. AHxH +BHz ≥ bH (25b)
AExE +BExH ≥ bE, (25c)
where yE is obtained as the dual variable associated with constraint (25c) (Byeon and Van Hentenryck 2020).
As a result, problem (6) can be approximated by the following linear bilevel optimization problem:
min
z∈{0,1}N,xH,xE≥0
yH,yE≥0
γc0
>
z+ γcH
>
xH + (1− γ) cE>xE (26a)
s.t. z ∈ZUC (26b)
Abidz+
1
(1− γ)B
bidyE ≥ bbid (26c)
xH,yE primal and dual sol. of (25). (26d)
Besides, by strong duality of the lower-level problem (26d), problem (26) is equivalent to problem (7).
It remains to show that problem (7) is an asymptotic approximation to problem (6), i.e., as γ→ 1 the
solutions to problem (7) become optimal solutions to problem (6). By introducing the auxiliary variables
y˜H =
yH
γ
, and y˜E =
yE
1− γ , problem (7) is equivalent to
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min
z∈{0,1}N,xH≥0
xE≥0,yH,yE
γc0
>
z+ γcH
>
xH + (1− γ) cE>xE (27a)
s.t. z ∈ZUC (27b)
Abidz+Bbidy˜E ≥ bbid (27c)
AHxH +BHz ≥ bH (27d)
AExE +BExH ≥ bE (27e)
y˜H
>
AH +
(1− γ)
γ
y˜E
>
BE ≤ cH> (27f)
y˜E
>
AE ≤ cE> (27g)
y˜H
> (
bH−BHz)− cH>xH ≥ (1− γ)
γ
(
cE
>
xE− y˜E>bE
)
. (27h)
Let us denote P (z∗) and P˜ (z∗) the optimal objective value of problems (20) and (27), respectively, with
the value of the unit commitment variable z fixed to z∗. Let
{
xH
∗
, xE
∗
, yH
∗
, yE
∗} be the optimal solutions to
P˜ (z∗). As γ→ 1, (27f) and (27h) become
y˜H
>
AH ≤ cH> (28a)
y˜H
> (
bH−BHz)−≥ cH>xH. (28b)
Constraint (27d) guarantees that xH∗ is feasible to problem (21) with z fixed to z∗. Additionally, (28a)
guarantees that yH∗ becomes feasible to problem (21) with z fixed to z∗ when γ → 1. Moreover, (28b)
guarantees that xH∗ and yH∗ , together, satisfy the strong duality equation of problem (21) with z fixed to
z∗ when γ→ 1. Therefore, xH∗ and yH∗ approximate the primal and dual optimal solutions to problem (21)
with z fixed to z∗ when γ→ 1. This implies that xH∗ and yH∗ become feasible solutions to P (z∗) when γ→ 1.
Moreover, the combination of (27h) and (27f) ×xH∗ gives
y˜H
> (
bH−BHz−AHxH∗)≥ (1− γ)
γ
(
cE
>
xE− y˜E> (bE−BExH∗)) . (29)
It follows from (27d) that, for any gamma γ ∈ [0,1]
y˜E
> (
bE−BExH∗)≥ cE>xE. (30)
Constraints (27e) and (27g) guarantee that xE∗ and yE∗ are feasible to problem (22) with xH fixed to xH∗ .
Additionally, (30) guarantees that xE∗ and yE∗ , together, satisfy the strong duality equation of problem (22)
with xH fixed to xH∗ . Therefore, xE∗ and yE∗ are the primal and dual optimal solutions to problem (22) with
xH fixed to xH∗ for any γ ∈ [0,1].
In summary, xH∗ is a feasible solution to P (z∗), which converges towards the optimal solution when γ→ 1,
and yE∗ is the optimal solution of the lower-level problem with respect to xH∗ for any γ ∈ [0,1]. Hence,
problem (7) always provides a feasible solution to problem (3), which converges towards the optimal solution
when γ→ 1.
